McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc.: Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill by Pitts, Richard & Stuart, Susan
Valparaiso University
ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications Law Faculty Presentations and Publications
1988
McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc.:
Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill
Richard Pitts
Susan Stuart
Valparaiso University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Administrative Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard Pitts & Susan Stuart, McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc.: Making a Mountain Out of a Molehill, 22 Ind. L. Rev. 1
(1988).
• 
Volume 22 1989 Number 1 
McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc.: Making a 
Mountain Out of a Molehill 
RICHARD PITTS* 
Susan Stuart** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the Indiana Supreme Court confronted head-on the issue 
of whether administrative agency decisions could be given res judicata 
or collateral estoppel effect in subsequent proceedings in McClanahan 
v. Remington Freight Lines, 1nc. 1 This Article addresses the historical 
precedents for application of the two doctrines in administrative law; 
discusses the impact of the supreme court's decision in McClanahan, 
and reviews the issues likely to arise in future, similar instances. 
The doctrine of res judicata stems from the basic principle that a 
matter which has been litigated and determined should not be re-litigated. 
Litigation must be final.2 Res judicata itself is also known as claim 
preclusion. Claim preclusion means that a previous adjudication of an 
action is a total bar to the same action in a subsequent suit.3 A derivative 
of res judicata is collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion. 
Issue preclusion generally does not work to bar a claim in toto, though 
it may as a practical matter have that effect. Rather, issue preclusion 
functions only to prevent a party from re-litigating a particular factually-
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1. 517 N .. E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988). 
2. See State v. Gurecki, 247 Ind. 218, 214 N.E.2d 392 (1966); Barker v. State, 
244 lnd. 267, 191 N.E.2d 9 (1963). 
3. Hardesty v. Bolerjack,. 441 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
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. 
oriented issue in a subsequent action, even if the causes of action in 
the two cases differ. 4 
. 
The basic requirements for res judicata are: (l) a court of competent 
jurisdiction, (2) a final judgment on the merits, (3) between the same 
parties or their privies, (4) on all matters essential to that judgment 
which were or might have been litigated.5 The basic requirements for 
collateral estoppel are (1) the same parties, (2) actually litigated the point 
subsequently at issue, and (3) both would have been bound by the 
determination had it been adverse to them.6 
. . 
II. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT 
A. Indiana Law 
Perhaps unwittingly, Indiana courts began sanctioning the use of 
res judicata to give preclusive effect to an agency decision nearly one 
hundred years ago. In Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Board of 
Commissioners/ a contractor abandoned the county's project to build 
a courthouse and jail. Bass Foundry, a subcontractor, agreed with the 
county to complete its iron work on the project at the original contract 
price, notwithstanding the fact that iron prices.had doubledin the interim. 
In return, the county agreed to pay Bass Foundry all amounts due and 
owing under the original contract despite a previous court determination 
which held that the county did not have the authority to agree to pay 
the full contract price.8 Bass Foundry then filed its claim with the county 
commissioners, who subsequently denied payment. No appeal of the 
commissioners' decision was taken. Instead, an independent action was 
instituted. 
The county alleged the previou·s resolution of the issue (denial by 
the county commissioners) was a bar to Bass Foundry's subsequent suit. 
The Indiana Supreme Court agreed, citing an 1879 statute which deprived 
circuit courts of jurisdiction in cases involving County Commissioners, 
except when an appeal was taken from the County Commissioners, 
decision. Had the case been left to that statutory, jurisdictional point 
• 
alone, there would have been little to commend it as a case giving res 
judicata effect to an administrative decision. The supreme court went 
beyond the statutory basis, however, and noted: "The purpose of filing 
4. Id. 
S. See Coulson v. State, 488 N.E.2d 1154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986); In reMarriage 
of Moser. 469 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). 
6. Hardesty, 441 N .E.2d at 245. 
7. 141 Ind. 68, 32 N.E. 112S (1894). 
8. Bass Foundry & Machine Works v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 115 Ind. 234, 17 N.E. 
593 (1888). 
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the claim before the board of commissioners was to recover the claim 
from the county, and that is the purpose and object of this suit, and 
the question is res judicata . . . . ''9 
The Bass Foundry analysis cleaves remarkably close to the analysis 
given to the issue today. The supreme court noted that the identity of 
the issues was the same in the court case and the administrative litigation: 
recovery of sums allegedly due under the second contract. Identity of 
issues is, of course, a keystone to modern res judicata decisions. The 
Bass Foundry court went further and noted that the identity of the 
parties was also the same: the county was, as the court termed it, a 
"real party in interest." 10 The court reasoned that addition of the original 
defaulting contractor as a party could not defeat this congruity of 
. identities. 11 Again, the Bass Foundry court, having little or no difficulty 
according the Commissioner's determination the same weight it would 
give to a previous trial court ruling, seized upon the fact that the parties 
were the same in both adjudications to validate the res judicata defense. 
Modern res judicata theory tends to demand this as well prior to successful 
invocation of the defense. 12 
Bass Foundry did not launch a full-scale application of res judicata 
to administrative decisions. Courts began to struggle with the issue-
not in terms of the res judicata doctrine itself, but in terms of whether 
an administrative decision was attended by the qualities and characteristics 
which should give rise to res judicata. In short, was the administrative 
decisional process sufficiently court-like to permit the administrative 
decisions to become final? 
The supreme court itself suggested that the answer was no in Board 
of Commissioners, Allen County v. Trautman. 13 When Helen Trautman 
thought she had been underpaid as a clerk in the county assessor's 
office, she filed a claim with the county board of commissioners. The 
board of commissioners disallowecJ the claim for the excess pay but did 
regularly pay the semi-monthly claims on the amounts agreed to be due. 
Trautman sued for the excess and received judgment in her favor. The 
Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, brushing away the coun-
ty's contention that the commissioners' decision on the claim was res 
judicata. The court cited a statute authorizing a claimant either to seek 
judicial review or sue independently but did not distinguish between 
judicial review of an administrative decision and a collateral attack. 
Instead, the court simply stated that the commissioners' decision was 
9. Bass Foundry, 141 Ind. at 72, 32 N .E. at 1126 (emphasis in original). 
10. ld. 
11. /d. 
12. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
13. 204 Ind. 362, 184 N.E. 178 (1933). 
• 
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• 
"administrative or ministerial and not judiciaL " 14 Presumably, therefore, 
the commissioners' decision could not be accorded res judicata effect . 
• 
In a later, unrelated case, the supreme court provided further ex-
planation for its rationale: 
[W]hen the Legislature defines its policy and prescribes a standard 
as it has in the act in question, it may leave to the executive 
boards and officers the determination of facts in order to apply 
the law .... An administrative officer charged with the admin-
istration of the laws enacted by the General Assembly necessarily 
exercises a discretion partaking of the characteristics of the 
judicial department of the government, but does not have the 
force and effect of a judgment. Unless an administrative officer 
or department is permitted to make reasonable rules and re-
gulations, it would be impossible in many instances to apply 
and enforce the legislative enactments, and the good to be 
accomplished would be entirely lost. 15 
. 
Apparently, res judicata was occasionally one of the Clffects which an 
administrative decision was not accorded. 
The court's reluctance to give full-blown effect to decisions stemmed 
in part, it seems, not from the procedural requisites necessary for res 
judicata to apply, but rather from the alien grounds as a matter of 
decisional framework upon which agency decisions are made. The re-
verse image of this principle is found in the time-honored principle of 
deference to agency expertise. For instance, the Indiana Supreme Court 
has written: 
Where the legislature has created a fact-finding body of experts 
in another branch of government, their decision or findings 
should not be lightly overridden because we, as judges, might 
reach a contrary opinion on the same evidence. So long as the 
experts act within the limits of the discretion given them by the 
statute, their. decision is final. 16 
In other words, the same policy motivating deference to agency expertise 
was actually a disincentive to applying res judicata to an agency decision. 
The anima mundi for an agency was its expertise in a given field; the 
14. /d. at 370, 184 N.E. at 181. 
15. Financial Aid Corp. v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 119-21, 23 N.E.2d 472, 475 
(1939) (The Financial Aid Corp . court was reviewing a revised enabling statute of the 
Department of Financial Institutions in the face of various constitutional challenges. The 
court upheld the act.). 
16. Public Serv. Comm'n v. City of Indianapolis, 235 Ind. 70, 79, 131 N .E.2d 
308, 311 (1956). 
.. 
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agency was presumably created by the legislature to provide innovative 
and problem- or industry ... specific answers to novel, complex issues. The 
principles of deciding issues on the narrowest possible factual and legal 
basis and adherence to prior decisions lynchpins of the common law-
were not necessarily proper fpr an administrative agency. Without this 
decisional framework, courts would not grant the conclusiveness to an 
administrative adjudication that was routinely granted to trial court 
adjudications. 17 Whether couched as a distinction between judicial and 
ministerial functions, as in Trautman, or located in the deference of 
courts to agency determinations, courts remained unsure of the proper 
"effect" to be given to an agency determination. 
This problem, coupled with the issue of which function (either 
.executive or legislative)18 an agency was exercising, caused a continuing 
struggle with res judicata questions in the context of the weight to be 
given previous administrative adjudications. In the 1970's res judicata's 
usefulness in agency decisions received a new test: could res judicata 
bind an agency to its own prior decision? A trilogy of zoning cases 
from 1970 to 1974 presented three milestones in the field: (a) establishing 
res judicata by name as a doctrine to be dealt with in the administrative 
context, (b) shifting the focus of the doctrine's applicability to the 
procedures attendant to the administrative decisional process, and (c) 
suggesting that, when an agency's decision could be termed judicial in 
nature, there was no serious impediment to granting that determination 
res judicata effect. 
The first case was Braughton v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning 
Appea/s. 19 There, disappointed landowners sought judicial review of a 
zoning variance grant to adjacent landowners. The landowners argued, 
inter alia, that the zoning board had previously denied a varianbe petition 
for the same property and proposed use. Because there had not been 
a showing of any factual difference between the previous and present 
17. Agencies are not expected to apply fixed or unyielding rules or policies, 
it was argued, but rather to exercise discretion and ingenuity in working out a 
satisfactory solution for each new case; and it was concluded that, at least to 
the extent that the doctrine of stare decisis ·is founded on the notion that the 
law is unchanging, the classical doctrine of stare decisis does not square with 
the theory and practices of the agencies. 
F. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 504 (1962). 
18. See Public Service Comm'n, 235 Ind. 70, 131 N.E.2d 308 (1956). In resolving 
a standard of review issue, the supreme court pointed out that "rate-making is a l~gislative, 
not a judicial function, and even if a statute attempted to lodge such power in a court 
it would be unconstitutional." ld. at 81, 131 N.E.2d at 312. 
19. 146 Ind. App. 652, 257 N.E.2d 839, reh'g denied, 146 Ind. App. 652, 258 
N.E.2d 866 (1970). 
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variance petitions, the landowners argued; there could be no change in 
the board's determination of the issue. 
Although not validating the res judicata argument entirely,20 the 
court of appeals wrote that a zoning board '''should not indiscriminately 
or repeatedly reconsider a determination denying a variance absent a 
change of conditions or circumstances."21 The burden to raise the issue 
and present evidence on it, the court held, fell upon the remonstrators 
seeking to show that circumstances indeed had not changed.22 
In Easley v. Metropolitan Board of Zoning Appeals,23 the court of 
appeals revisited the burden of proof issue created by Braughton. The 
Easley court was faced with the issue of how remonstrators could prove 
a change in. circumstances when the reasons for the prior variance de.nial 
were not a matter of public record. To remedy this problem, the court 
imposed upon the zoning boards the requirement that, "in all future 
cases and in those pending or in which the determination has not become 
final, it [tbe board] should specify by factual finding or by a statement 
of reasons the basis for denial of the variance petitions." 24 
The final case of the trilogy,_ decided between Easley and Braughton, 
was Board of Zoning Appeals v. Sink.2s Unlike Easley and Braughton,. 
Sink did not involve a quasi-res judicata effect as between two agency 
decisions. Instead, the issue· presented in Sink was whether a-retnonstrator 
could. use a previous, unappealed trial court· judgment, which reversed 
a variance grant, to gain reversal of the board's. granting of a second, 
similar petition without following the required procedure for direct ju-
dicial review. 
Of crucial importance in Sink is the court's statement that "[m]ost 
courts have viewed the granting or denying of variance by Boards of 
Zoning Appeals as a quasi-judicial determination and have applied the 
doctrine of res judicata to their decisions. This is the law in Indiana.' ' 26 
20. The court suggested that there were other instances where ''the doctrine of 
res judicata is clearly applicable." /d. at 659; 257 N.E.2d at 843; see also id. at 658 n.2, 
257 N.E.2d at 842 n.2. 
21. ld. at 658, 257 N .E.2d at 842-. 
22. /d. 
23. 161 Ind. App. 501, 317 N.E.2d 185 (1974) .. 
24. Id. at 512, 317 N.E.2d at 192. The court went on to .state: "Thereafter, 
remonstrators against subsequent variance petitions may successfully assert a defense in· 
the nature of tes Judicata by merely establishing the fact of the prior denial unless the 
petitioner proves that there has been a change· in the conditions, circumstances or facts 
which induced the prior denial. H /d. 
25. 153 Ind. App. 1, 285. N.E.2d 655 (1972). 
26. /d. at 8, 285 N.E.2d at 659. The court cited Braughton for the latter proposition; 
the c.ourt also cited Beaven v. Village of Palatine, 22 Ill. App. 2d 274, 160 N'.E.2d 702 
(1959); Turf Valley Assocs. v. Zoning Bd. of Howard Co., 262 Md. 632, 278 A.2d 574 
(1971); In re Clements' Appeal, 2 Ohio App. 2d 201., 207 N.E.2d 573 (1965). 
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The court held that the remonstrators could not bypass the administrative 
agency (and judicial review of the agency's actions) and assert res judicata 
directly before the trial court rendering the first decision. Instead, it 
was incumbent upon the remonstrators to establish the elements of the 
quasi-res judicata defense, as outlined in Braughton, before the agency 
in the first instance. Review of the agency's decision on the res judicata 
issue could then be had by normal routes of judicial review. 27 
Sink, when read in conjunction with its policy statements concerning 
the salutary effects of res judicata, 28 establishes res judicata as a method 
of either attacking or defending an agency decision. Sink also suggests 
that so long as the decision is quasi-judicial, res judicata must be dealt 
with. Braughton and Easley, focusing on how the board may find changed 
circumstances and on the precise contours of the change in circumstances 
• (in the context of zoning) which will justify a different result, evidence 
a shift toward ensuring that re-litigation can be had when procedures 
are not in place which allow review and understanding of the original 
decision. Res judicata effect will not be given to an agency decision 
which cannot be explained .or understood. For instance, there must be 
a statement of reasons for the denial of the variance under Easley. By 
the same token, perhaps, res judicata effect will not be given to an 
agency decision which has not followed proper procedure for decision-
making. In other words, Braughton and Easley may have foreshadowed 
a subtle shift toward procedure over deference to the substantive nature 
(i.e., expertise) of the agency decision. 
B. United States Supreme Court History 
The seminal case in United States Supreme Court pronouncements 
is relatively recent. In 1966, the decision in United States v. Utah 
Construction & Mining Co. 29 explicitly validated for the first time granting 
administrative decisions res judicata effect. In Utah Construction, the 
issue was, in its simplest form, whether the decision of the Advisory 
Board of Contract Appeals was entitled to res judicata effect in a 
subsequent suit in the Court of Claims. The Court of Claims ordered 
27. Sink, 153 Ind. App. at 8, 285 N.E.2d at 659. 
28. The court noted that the bar on re-litigation of disputes formerly decided is 
a matter of public policy, and is based upon economies of time and fairness to parties. 
/d. at 7, 285 N .E.2d at 658-59. The Sink court's statements must be limited to the context 
of that case: whether res judicata effect for a trial court-not agency-decision could 
effectively short-circuit the administrative review process. Nonetheless, given the positive 
statement by the court that res judicata would apply to agency quasi-judicial determinations, 
there can be little doubt that the same benefits which obtain from res judicata in a court 
would also, in the Sink court's view, apply to an agency decision. 
29. 384 u.s. 394 (1966). 
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that the contractor's delay claims (for contract price adjustment and 
time extension) be heard in a trial de novo, rather than based solely 
upon the administrative record before the Advisory Board of Contract 
Appeals.30 
The Supreme Court's holding was ostensibly based on the Wunderlich 
Act of 1954, which required that decisions of the agency should b~ 
final, absent extreme circumstances.31 The Supreme Court went beyond 
this, however, to reach the general res judicata32 issue as developed by 
common law. The Court boldly stated: 
Occasionally courts have used language to the effect that res 
judicata principles do not apply to administrative proceedings, 
but such language is certainly too broad. When an administrative 
agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues 
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate 
opportunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply 
res judicata to enforce repose. 33 
This declaration seems at odds with the authority cited but appears to 
have been intentionally created for future application to cases where the 
issue was more directly presented. 
Professor Davis suggests that the statement was by no means mere 
obiter dictum. Instead, he writes, "The statement was carefully crafted. 
Each detail has significance. " 34 Review of the primary authority of the 
Utah Construction Court, Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 35 
bears this premise out. Sunshine Anthracite petitioned the National 
Bituminous Coal Commission for a determination that its coal was not 
subject to the Commission's jurisdiction. The petition was denied; Sun-
shine then unsuccessfully sought judicial review of the commission's 
decision. Later, the Internal Revenue Service sought to collect taxes based 
on the fact that Sunshine actually produced bituminous coal. In the 
Supreme Court's opinion, res judicata effect was given to the court 
30. Utah Constr. & Mining Co. v. United States, 339 F.2d 606, 609-10 (Ct. Cl. 
1964). 
31. The statute provided that "any such decision shall be final and conclusive 
unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as 
necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported by substantial evidence." 384 U.S. at 
399 (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 321 (1964)). 
32. The precise issue before the Court was one of collateral estoppel: whether the 
factual findings of the board were conclusive in the subsequent litigation of the alleged 
breach of contract. Utah Constr. , 384 U.S. at 400. For convenience, the discussion herein 
is of res judicata generally. 
33. /d. at 421-22. 
34. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 21:2, at 49 (1983). 
35. 310 u.s. 381 (1940). 
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decision which reviewed the Bituminous Coal Commission decision, 36 not 
the Bituminous Coal Com.mission decision itself. 
The distinction may at first appear to be· of little significance. Yet 
the previous court judgment allowed the Sunshine Anthracite Court to 
speak in terms of res judicata with little difficulty. The Court spoke in 
terms of "a judgment" rendered in "each of these two suits." In the 
Court~s view, this made the key issue "whether or not in the earlier 
litigation the representative of the United States had [the] authority to 
represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy.' ;37 
Consequently, the Court found unassailable the Coal Commission's au-
thority to decide the matter and then enter the subsequent litigation. 
With those two conclusions reached, the ultimate conclusion was clear: 
the court decision, affirming the Bituminous Coal Commission, bound 
both the commission and the Internal Revenue Service because a judicial 
decision which binds the United States binds all its agencies .. 38 
The decision in Sunshine Anthracite is, in this light, much removed 
from the Utah Construction decision. Utah Construction involved making 
final an agency decision in a subsequent court case; Sunshine Anthracite 
was effectively a case of one court judgment being given preclusive 
effect in a subsequent court case. Professor Davis continues with his 
evaluation of Utah Construction: 
The only part of the statement that is subject to doubt is that 
"the courts have not hesitated., ... " It should be interpreted 
to mean that the Supreme Court did not hesitate in the Utah 
Construction case, for the Supreme Court before that case did 
a good deal of hesitating.39 
It is, then, appropriate to take the Utah Construction Court's state-
ment in smaller pieces. The pre-requisites to giving res_ judicata effect 
to an agency decision are four-fold. 40 First, the agency must be acting 
in judicial capacity. Legislative actions by the agency, such as rulemaking, 
do not fall within the limits of the administrative res judicata doctrine. 
So, too, may decisions which require agency expertise and are perhaps 
not attended by trial-type procedures. 
Second, the agency must be resolving disputed issues of fact. At 
first blush, the requirement seems to be derivative of the first, because 
determination of the historical facts (to which the law is then applied) 
seems at the core of the judicial function. However, the statement may 
36. Id. at 403-04. 
37. ld~ at 403. 
38. /d. 
39. K. DAVIS, supra note 34, § 21:2, at 49. 
40. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co.t 384 U.S. 394 (1966). 
' 
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be less innocuous than it seems. The effect to be given to an agency 
decision may extend only to the brute, cold, historical facts the actual 
events which transpired. Evaluative facts, those shading more toward 
legal conclusions, along with the legal conclusions, may not be subject 
to a res judicata effect. The distinction between giving res judicata effect 
to fact findings but not legal conclusions may separate administrative 
res judicata from the court-oriented res judicata.41 
Thirdly, the fact issues must have been ''properly before'' the ad-
ministrative agency. Apparently, jurisdictional defects at the agency level, 
and perhaps even procedural, non-fundamental defects in the agency's 
decisional process will prevent using the agency decision in subsequent 
litigation. The Utah Construction Court noted that if an agency gra-
tuitously made findings on an issue, even an issue over which it had 
jurisdiction, ''such findings would have no finality whatsoever.' '42 Con-
sequently, an agency decision, even if all the remaining prerequisites are 
met, still may not be entitled to preclusive effect. A search for procedural 
defects lurking behind the administrative record, as well as the scope 
of the issues actually litigated, is necessary for a determination of whether 
an agency decision is actually the final determination of the issue. 
Fourth, the parties before the agency must "have had an adequate 
opportunity to litigate'' the disputed issues of fact.43 Actual utilization 
of the opportunity need not be afforded. Nevertheless, the issue does 
not end there. Requisites for procedural due process certainly figure in 
the calculus, as does the nature of the administrative state, where many 
dispositions are made without hearing, without the presence of the 
affected party, and probably without the presence of counsel. 
Obviously, superimposing additional prerequisites to use of res ju-
dicata for agency decisions is designed to promote some control over 
subsequent use of administrative decisions while at the same time en-
couraging ''the parties to make a complete disclosure at the administrative 
level, rather than holding evidence back for subsequent litigation.' ' 44 
This background sets the stage for understanding and analyzing the 
Indiana Supreme Court's decision in McClanahan v. Remington Freight 
Lines, Inc. 45 
III. THE McCLANAHAN CAs~ 
John McClanahan drove a truck for Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 
an Indiana company. McClanahan, who started work in November 1981, 
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDOMENTS § 27 (1982). See a/so K. DAVIS, 
supra note 34, at 51. 
42. Utah Constr., 384 U.S. at 419 n.l5. 
43. !d. at 422. • 
44. Id. at 420. 
45. 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988). 
46. The facts in this section are taken from the Court of Appeals decision, 498 
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had no contract of employment. McClanahan was travelling from New 
York to Minnesota, carrying a load that weighed 78,000 pounds. Federal 
law allowed 80,000 pound loads; Illinois allowed only 75,000 pound 
loads. Before reaching Illinois, McClanahan called the safety director 
for Remington, Richard Barbour, and told him that the load was too 
heavy. 
Barbour told McClanahan that the company would pay any fine he 
incurred and that he probably would not be caught in any event . 
. 
McClanahan continuously refused to drive through Illinois. McClanahan 
drove back to Remington's terminal, on orders from Remington. When 
he returned, McClanahan was fired; Remington's employee manual de-
fined his termination as a ''voluntary quit.'' 
McClanahan applied for unemployment benefits. The initial appli-
cation was refused, without hearing. McClanahan pursued an appeal to 
the Indiana Employment Security Division's Appellate Section. A hearing 
was held at which McClanahan and Barbour both testified. The hearing 
. 
officer reversed the initial determination, holding that McClanahan was 
not discharged for just cause. He was therefore entitled, the· hearing 
officer held, to unemployment compensation. No appeal was taken to 
the Indiana Employment Security Division's full board from the hearing 
officer's order. 
Having secured his unemployment compensation benefits, Mc-
Clanahan then instituted a separate action against Remington and. Barbour 
in the Tippecanoe County Superior Court. He alleged retaliatory and 
wrongful discharge. Both McClanahan and Remington moved for sum-
mary judgment. McClanahan argued that re-litigation of the reasons for 
his discharge was not permitted: the decision of the hearing officer was 
• 
collateral estoppel in the court case as to the facts causing his discharge. 
Remington sought summary judgment on the ultimate merits of the case: 
McClanahan was an employee at will and could be terminated for any 
(or no) reason and hence had no cause of action. The trial court granted 
Remington's motion and denied McClanahan's. 
The Second District of the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the 
grant of summary judgment in Remington's favor, and affirmed the 
denial of McClanahan's motion. On the first issue, the court held that 
"if, as Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co. clearly holds, an employee 
cannot be discharged solely for exercising a statutory right, logic and 
justice compel us to hold that an employee can.not be discharged solely 
for refusing to breach a statutorily imposed duty.' ' 47 
N.E.2d 1336 (Ind. Ct. App. l986), and the Indiana Supreme Court's opinion on transfer, 
517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988). 
47. 517 N .E.2d at 392 (quoting Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 
297 N.E.2d 425 (1973)). 
• 
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On the second issue, whether the reasons for McClanahan's discharge 
were relitigable, the court held that McClanahan had not presented a 
sufficient evidentiary basis for the imposition of collateral estoppel. The 
decision of the appeals referee (hearing officer) was not certified and 
could not be properly considered by the trial judge in determining the 
summary judgment motion. The appeals court found that the transcript 
of the proceedings before the hearing officer did not contain the hearing 
officer's decision and was thus an insufficient basis upon which to base 
a summary judgment ruling. 
However, the court chose to address the general collateral estoppel 
issue because of its likely recurrence on remand. The court concluded 
that the decisions of the Indiana Employment Security Division could 
be given res judicata effect. Acknowledging the procedures for notice, 
evidentiary record, oaths, and subpoenas in the appeals referee hearing, 
the court determined that the proceedings were judicial in nature, par-
ticularly in view of the appeals referee's authority to affirm, modify or 
reverse the previous determination. 
In a footnote, the court suggested some instances in which the agency 
.decision was not to be accorded collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. 48 
Noting that collateral estoppel effect is not proper when convincing 
reasons are advanced why the agency decision should not be final, the 
court of appeals suggested a total failure to observe procedural safeguards 
or a consideration of inadmissible evidence might be such a convincing 
reason. Nevertheless, the court held that, the appeals referee's decision, 
upon a proper evidentiary foundation, was entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in this case. 
The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer. 49 The court affirmed 
the lower court's holding that McClanahan had stated a valid cause of 
action. The court also addressed the collateral estoppel issue because of 
its likely recurrence. Unlike the court of appeals, the Indiana Supreme 
Court declined to give the appeals referee's decision collateral estoppel 
effect. The high court adopted the following analysis for the issue: "1) 
whether the issues sought to be estopped were within the statutory 
jurisdiction of the agency; 2) whether the agency was acting in a judicial 
capacity; 3) whether both parties had a fair opportunity to litigate the 
issues; [and] 4) whether the decision of the administrative tribunal could 
be appealed to a judicial tribunal. " 50 The application of this analysis 
of the facts before the court is critical to an informed understanding 
of McClanahan ,s effect on later cases involving collateral estoppel and 
administrative decisions. 
48. 498 N.E.2d at 1343 n.S. 
49. 517 N.E.2d at 391. 
50. /d. at· 394. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF McCLANAHAN 
The first and foremost task in analyzing McClanahan is to examine 
its underlying rationale and determine whether there is any basis in law 
for the result reached by the supreme court. Besides the two Indiana 
cases cited in the opinion, South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National 
Education Association51 and Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Association, 
Inc. ,52 the primary basis for the court's result was engendered by the 
federal district court case of Gear v. City of Des Moines. 53 In that case, 
where the factual situation54 was very similar to that present in Mc-
Clanahan, the trial court set forth four elements which must be fulfilled 
by a prior administrative decision before its collateral application to a 
related civil rights claim. The Indiana Supreme Court faithfully repro-
duced those elements in its own inquiry into McClanahan's case: (1) the 
matters at issue must be within the agency's statutory jurisdiction; (2) 
the agency had to function judicially; (3) both parties had to have a 
fair opportunity to litigate the issues; (4) the administrative decision 
must be appealable.55 The Gear court found the Iowa Job Service's 
decision worthy of collateral estoppel effect; the Indiana Supreme Court 
applied these same four factors to the decision of the Indiana Employment 
Security Division and found it wanting. 
This result is difficult to justify because the Iowa agency's procedures 
were almost identical to the Indiana agency's, even to the extent that 
there is no trial de novo on disputed issues of fact. This result is also 
difficult to justify because of the four elements themselves. There is one 
statement in Gear, however, which is particularly illuminating and clearly 
justifies the decision rendered by the Indiana court: ''Additional related 
factors which must figure in the court's analysis include the deference 
accorded opinions of a particular administrative entity by the state courts, 
the intention of that entity and the expectations of the parties regarding 
judicial retrial of factual questions determined in administrative pro-
ceedings. ''56 Although not specifically endorsed by the McClanahan court, 
51. 180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). 
52. 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
53. 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
54. In Gear, a female former police officer was denied unemployment compensation 
upon a factual finding that she had left her employment voluntarily and without good 
cause. In her later lawsuit for relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and the fourteenth 
amendment of the United States Constitution, the defendants attempted to erect the Iowa 
Department of Job Service's finding as collateral estoppel to further litigation of the facts 
dispositive of her civil rights action. On the basis of the procedures before the Department, 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants on the matter of collateral estoppel. /d. 
55. 517 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ind. 1988). 
56. 514 F. Supp. at 1221. 
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it is very apparent that these considerations weighed more heavily in its 
decision than the enumerated criteria. Thus, the court could freely state 
that, despite the obvious opportunity for review as required by the fourth 
factor, it considered instead the fact that it was ''altogether likely that 
Remington would have pursued the appeal had it known McClanahan's 
intent to file a civil action for substantial damages. " 57 How else to 
explain the cavalier treatment of the administrative procedures, procedures 
which are, by law, required to be informal in order to relieve the burden 
on trial courts? The McClanahan court obviously rendered only lip-
service to the factors listed by the Gear court and instead determined 
that the defendants had neither a full nor fair opportunity to litigate 
the factual issue before the division on the premise that to decide 
otherwise would be inequitable because they had not taken full and fair 
advantage of the opportunity actually offered them. As critical as that 
statement may seem, it is not altogether clear that the McClanahan court 
did not reach the correct result in any event, regardless of its failure 
to acknowledge the Gear elements. 
One must first re-examine the substance of the elements the Gear 
opinion posited for application of collateral estoppel in the agency-
judiciary context. (These four factors are not to be confused with the 
four integral parts of the essential collateral estoppel inquiry itself.)58 
Primarily, a court is to look at the nature of the proceeding, the due 
process offered the parties (opportunity to litigate and opportunity for 
review), and the agency's jurisdiction over the issue in question. The 
standard for application of these factors is tempered ''selectively and 
with a greater degree of flexibility' 'S9 than is afforded the traditional 
' 
application of res judicata of judicial decisions. The problem with this 
approach on collateral review of agency decisions is that it is directly 
contrary to the well-established standard of judicial review of agency 
decisions on direct review. 
It is well-settled by both statute and case law that on direct appeal 
from an administrative decision, a court has only limited review of that 
decision. However, it is interesting that the criteria governing that review 
bear a more than coincidental resemblance to the Gear factors. By 
statute, an Indiana court may grant relief from an agency decision only 
57. 517 N.E.2d at 395 (emphasis added). 
58. There are four basic elements of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must 
have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the matter now in issue was, 
or might have been, determined in the former suit; (3) the particular controversy previously 
adjudicated must have been between the parties to the present suit or their privies; and 
(4) the judgment in the former suit must have been rendered on the merits. Cox v. Indiana 
Subcontractors Ass'n, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
59. Gear, 514 F. Supp. at 1221. 
• 
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if its action is (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or 
otherwise not in accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, 
power, privilege, or immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right; (4) without obser-
vance of procedure required by law; or (5) unsupported by substantial 
evidence.60 The common law ingredients, for those agencies not governed 
by the Administrative Adjudication Act,61 are the same.62 Distilled to 
their essence, the direct review criteria are almost the same as those set 
forth in Gear: Did the agency have jurisdiction? Did the agency afford 
the aggrieved party due process? Was the decision void for any reason 
supplied by the law? It is apparent there is very little to distinguish the 
items a court considers on direct review of an administrative adjudication 
from those used in Gear and McClanahan in determining whether to 
allow its collateral use except the actual application of those factors. 
The critical difference between the two applications is that on direct 
review., courts are inclined to give much greater deference to the decision 
of the agency63 than the supreme court did in the McClanahan case. In 
other words, on direct appeal, an agency determination is more likely 
to be upheld on the very same notions that make it unlikely it will be 
given effect in a collateral matter. Therefore, a party stands a much 
greater chance of being bound by such a decision if he takes the matter 
directly for review than if he opts to take his chances in a different 
proceeding involving the same issues before the agency. The McClanahan 
opinion, if nothing else, gives an aggrieved party another opportunity 
to relitigate the issues and to succeed on the merits, when the agency 
decision has been otherwise unfavorable. On collateral matters, the agency 
decision is less likely to prohibit the trial court from retrying the very 
same case whereas de novo relief is not typically available in judicial 
review. 64 
This lack of symmetry in the application of the same factors to the 
same sort of decision but with different results is troublesome. There 
appear to be three solutions to this problem. One could dispense with 
60. IND. CODE § 4-21.5-5-14(d) (1988). 
61. IND. CODE §§ 4-21.5-1-1 to -2-4 (1988). 
62. See, e.g., Tilton v. Southwest School Corp., 151 Ind. App. 608, 281 N.E.2d 
117 (1972). 
63. See e.g., New Trend Beauty School, Inc. v. Indiana State Bd. of Beauty 
Culturist Examiners, 518 N.E.2d 1101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); Drake v. City of Gary, 449 
N.E.2d 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983). 
64. IND. CoDE § 4-21.5-5-11 (1988) sets forth the following limitation on the 
introduction of evidence upon judicial review of an administrative decision: "Judicial 
review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to the agency record for the agency 
action supplemented by additional evidence taken under section 12 of this chapter. The 
court may not try the cause de novo or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 
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the Gear criteria altogether .in matters of collateral attack and consider 
only the four basic elements of collateral estoppel itself. The McClanahan 
court obviously followed this course. Or one could apply the· factors in 
matters of collateral attack in the same fashion they are treated on direct 
judicial review. Lastly, one could formulate a different set of criteria 
than those· set forth by the Gear and McClanahan decisions. 
With the first solution, a trial court would simply apply the four 
basic elements of collateral estoppel65 but would also determine whether 
the agency's decision was sufficiently congruent with trial proceedings 
to grant it the deference due to judicial decisions. This format, for 
which there is already established precedent in McClanahan, has a prac-
tical appeal to it. Unless the parties' expectations evince otherwise, it 
could be presumed that they did not .grant sufficient weight to the 
informal proceedings before the administrative agency to make them be 
bound by its decisions in a collateral judicial matter that may very well 
have greater ramifications. For instance, McClanahan's claim for un-
employment compensation, garnering as it did only a minimal economic 
award, could not have presaged to his employer that a larger wrongful 
discharge suit lurked in the wings. Therefore, as is their wont, the parties 
probably took the entire proceedings before the Employment Security 
Division much more lightly, given the informality and routine nature 
of the proceedings. On the other hand, a matter before the Medical 
Licensing Board has a greater potential for grave consequences and for 
greater care and preparation by the parties. A decision by the Licensing 
Board is more likely to deprive a party of property and liberty rights 
to which specific due process protections inhere .. Therefore,. that agency 
is more likely,_ as a matter of course, to conduct traditional judicial 
proceedings although perhaps somewhat more informally as allowed by 
statute. Under the McClanahan rationale, which is dependent upon 
whether the hearing ''differed substantially from a traditional courtroom 
proceeding,''66 greater credence would therefore be given a Board decision 
than the one at issue in McClanahan and collateral estoppel principles 
more likely effected. 
This result may appear to be in derogation of the whole purpose 
for creating agencies in the first place to delegate certain judicial re-
sponsibilities to governmental entities with expertise in specific areas of 
the law. McClanahan might be read to suggest such a ''cavalier'' result 
inasmuch as some agency decisions could fall by the wayside upon 
collateral attack because their proceedings are not conducted as if in a 
courtroom, nor were they conceived to be. However, the likelihood of 
65. See, e.g.~ Hardesty v. Bolerjack, 441 N .E.2d 243, 245 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
66. 517 N .E.2d at 394-95. 
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any great number of decisions reaching the posture present in McClanahan 
seems very remote there are only two S\lCh scenarios in contemporary 
Indiana case law, McClanahan and Cox.67 In addition, it is not unlikely 
that the expectations of the parties could be better served by a "retrial" 
on the merits. Otherwise, agency decisions may end up as formalistic 
as judicial proceedings in order to forestall unexpected collateral attacks, 
an outcome not contemplated when the delegation of judicial duties was 
imposed upon agencies .. The McClanahan opinion may therefore be more 
in line with current attitudes regarding collateral review of agency de-
cisions than its lack of reliance on Gear might imply. 
The second alternative would be to apply the already established 
direct review criteria as pronounced by Gear uniformly to both direct 
attacks on administrative decisions, via judicial review, and collateral 
attacks. The simplicity in applying this standard is apparent when one 
contemplates the wealth of case law from which the courts could draw 
in the context of judicial review. In addition, applying the Gear standard 
would accord to agency decisions the dignity to which they are entitled 
by reason of their fact-finding function .. This posture, of course, would 
make McClanahan and Cox incorrectly resolved. 
The primary motivation for wielding an agency decision as a weapon 
in a judicial collateral attack, be it offensively or defensively, is to 
expedite proceedings. If a fact at issue has been already determined 
before a trier of fact, i.e., the administrative agency, there seems no 
reasonable need to retry the matter before yet another trier of fact. 
And this is the crucial point that the Cox and McClanahan courts 
appeared to miss. The only branch of res judicata amenable for use in 
the administrative context is issue preclusion/collateral estoppel. Estoppel 
by judgment is out of the question for the very reason that agencies 
were established they dispense specialized remedies not available to trial 
courts. There could be no estoppel between the judgment of a trial 
court and the decision of an agency. That therefore leaves, by default, 
collateral estoppel as the res judicata tool used by trial courts when 
confronted with the resolution of the same or similar issues by an agency. 
The Cox court evinced no understanding of this tenet when it 
challenged the agency's expertise to decide contract issues. That expertise 
is beside the point because that was never the "issue" before the 
Employment Security Division. Rather, the Division determined that Cox 
had been terminated for just cause by his employer. When his employer 
attempted to use the fact of his statutorily lawful termination in Cox's 
breach of contract action, such fact was apparently to be used simply 
as one established element among many in the civil litigation. There is 
67. Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Ass'n, 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
• 
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no intimation from the case's presentation of the facts that Cox's proper 
termination was ipso facto a determination of his contract claim. Rather, 
the agency's finding of fact might have been used in the Association's 
defense of Cox's claim-· to justify the employer's alleged breach if indeed 
such breach existed at all. In any event, it is clear the Cox case mis-
understood the use of the agency's finding and misunderstood the basic 
concept of collateral attack in the agency-judiciary context. 
The court in Shortridge v. Review Board of Indiana Employment 
Security Division,68 however, was right on target when it held that an 
agency's findings of fact are binding on collateral attack. This principle 
is what some courts seem to lose sight of when they encourage giving 
less deference to agency decisions than to judicial decisions. The only 
application for agency determinations in court cases is in the matter of 
fact-finding. Fact-finding is not a specialized area reserved for the ex-
pertise of trial courts. Indeed, it is the basic function of agencies to 
render certain specialized remedies. Nevertheless, underlying those rem-
edies are factual determinations. In fact, administrative agencies are 
typically required to consider three types of facts: evidentiary facts which 
form the foundation for their basic findings of fact upon which they 
determine their ultimate findings of fact (remedies).69 Given the burden 
that agencies must bear with regard ~o the factual conclusions they must 
draw, 70 particularly for purposes of judicial review and despite the 
informalities inhering in their procedures, there seems no reason why 
their factual determinations should be given any less credence than a 
trial court's in the matter of collateral estoppel. A trier·of-fact is a trier-
of-fact is a trier-of-fact. There is simply no rational explanation for not 
honoring that role in the determination of the credibility of witnesses 
and weighing of evidence for purposes of establishing factual matters 
on collateral attack. As discussed above, it is expected from the agencies 
as a matter of law on direct attack by judicial review. And courts give 
deference to it. As a consequence, there also seems no rational reason 
why the Gear criteria cannot be applied with the force used in judicial 
review when a court is confronted with an agency decision on collateral 
attack. 
As a third alternative, one could formulate a different set of rules. 
In light of the conclusions regarding the other two alternatives, that 
• 
68. 498 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
69. See, e.g., Perez v. United States Steel Corp., 426 N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ind. 1981) 
(''[F) in dings of basic fact must reveal the Board's analysis of the evidence and its 
determination therefrom regarding the various specific issues of fact which bear on the 
particular claim. The 'finding of ultimate fact' is the ultimate factual conclusion regarding 
the particular claim before the Board.''). 
70. /d. 
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would hardly seem a useful exercise. The embryo for the notion that 
administrative res judicata even needed an independent s·et of rules was 
formed in Professor Davis' well-recognized treatise on administrative 
law. 71 Professor Davis' premise was that administrative agencies often 
work with fluid facts and shifting policies.72 How an agency's function 
in this regard differs significantly from that of a trial court is difficult 
to discern, but evidently Davis was concerned more with the agency-
agency decisions rather than agency-judiciary matters. Agencies, being 
creatures of politics, are often governed by the vagaries of patronage 
in each administration resulting in new board memberships, and con-
sequently, new agendas. Regardless, a set of rules would be useful, if 
focused on the proper goal, in order to confront more objectively other 
situations such as that which arose in McClanahan. 
A framework for formulating a set of rules in the collateral use of 
agency decisions in a later lawsuit should adopt portions of the first 
two solutions discussed above but as a disinct permutation entire unto 
itself. Actually, the McClanahan court contributed to such a set of rules, 
albeit perhaps unwittingly. The first element is that which sets agencies 
apart from judicial tribunals in the first instance the identification of 
the agency function. (1) Did the agency act in a judicial capacity (as 
opposed to its legislative capacity)? Once that is determined in the 
affirmative, the trial court simply applies the remaining three nonjur-
isdictional elements of collateral estoppel: (2) Did the agency decision 
involve and bind the same parties or their privies? (3) Was the agency 
decision final, i.e., unreviewed? (4) Was the issue at hand actually 
"litigated" and essential to the agency's decision? 73 The rules look 
familiar; however, the first step which sets agency decisions apart from 
trial court judgments has its own considerations. 
Whether the agency acted in a judicial capacity is not an inquiry 
that goes deep enough. It was not even an inquiry that the McClanahan 
court took at face value. Although McClanahan and his employer took 
part in a judicial proceeding, it was simply not "judicial" enough. In 
reaching that conclusion, the supreme court looked at the parties' ex-
pectations and the actual occurrence of events before the agency. That 
approach is not entirely bad because the right result was reached in the 
McClanahan decision. However, the subjective element . of the parties' 
expectations is simply too uncertain to use as an appropriate element 
of the judicial nature of an agency proceedings. 
Rather, the emphasis on the judicial capacity of the agency should 
center on an objective inquiry as to what actually happened before the 
71. DAVIS, supra note 34, at §§ 18.01, 18.04. 
72. /d. 
73. McClanahan, 517 N.E.2d at 394. 
• 
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agency and on whether those events comport with our notions of a 
judicial function. Those investigations must take into account the leg-
islatively mandated informality of such proceedings, and the measure 
of that informality would also have a direct relationship to the parties' 
expectations. Hence, the elimination of one of McClanahan's questions 
is the elimination of an ill-defined yardstick. What the trial court should 
be limited to is a review of the agency record and that record alone. 
From the information thereint the court could .determine (1). the 
adversarial nature of the proceedingst i.e., did the parties actually litigate 
the issues in the case or was the issue so small that it was considered 
a fait accompli upon the presentation of the petitioner's case? Did the 
hearing examiner assist petitioner in the presentation of his case?; and 
(2) the due process accorded the parties, i.e., how strictly did the hearing 
examiner adhere to the rules of evidence? Was cross-examination avail-
able? Was testimony under oath? · 
These two concerns were primary factors in the McClanahan decision 
and correctly so. 74 However, taking out the subjective elements of that 
opinion and limiting the trial court's assessment of the agency's judicial 
function to the actual record before it will confine the inquiry to the 
objective nature of the elements rather than making collateral estoppel 
decisions subject to the varying strengths of the parties' arguments 
dependent upon "if only I had known the consequences." Once this 
objective hurdle is crossed, the trial court then either denies estoppel 
effect to the decision outright or goes on to consider the remaining 
collateral estoppel elements. Simplistic by nature, these rules need not 
be anymore complicated. To do so would merely, and unnecessarily, 
obfuscate a doctrine which has enjoyed unparalleled success between 
trial court opinions without such subjective confusion. 
V. APPLICATION OF McCLANAHAN 
. 
After having engaged in extensive analysis of McClanahan7s and 
addre·ssing its immediate ramifications vis a vis its actual application to 
cases of the same ilk, one must consider the effects, if any, this case 
will have on the whole broad spectrum of the matter of the res judicata 
effect to be given to administrative decisions in the judicial arena. Such 
an investigation entails consideration of other "current" Indiana cases, 
such as South Bend Federation of Teachers v. National Education 
Association76 and Cox v. Indiana Subcontractors Association, Inc. ,'7 as 
74. See id. at 395. 
75. 517 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 1988) . 
.... 
76. 180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (1979). 
77. 441 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1.982). 
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well as of the manner in which the issue is presented to a court for 
review. Primarily, the distinction is whether a trial court is applying the 
doctrine between two decisions of the same agency or between an agency 
decision and a trial court proceeding. Indiana case law suggests that 
distinction makes a difference. 
South Bend Federation of Teachers is more akin to the zoning cases 
discussed previously78 because it consisted of the application of an agency 
decision to a later decision of the same agency. In the South Bend case, 
the matter was brought to a head in a judicial challenge to a decision 
of the Indiana Education Employment Relations Board (IEERB). One 
teachers' association (NEA) filed a Verified Complaint to enjoin IEERB 
from exercising jurisdiction over an election petition filed by a rival 
association (AFT). The basis for the: complaint was a decision entered 
on March 25, 1977. The thrust of the complaint was that IEERB- was 
bound to apply an earlier 1974 board decision in favor of NEA, rather 
than be allowed to issue a second decision in favor of AFT. In a well-
reasoned opinion, presaging Gear v. City of Des Moines,79 Judge Buch-
anan determined that no facts had intervened between the two IEERB 
decisions necessitating a change in position from the 1974 ruling, and 
the parties, as. well as IEERB, were bound by the earlier declarations 
regarding the same factual determination material to both decisions80-
the interpretation of an election agreement among the two associations 
and the s_chool corporation. 81 
As with McClanahan, the court of appeals was confronted with a 
factual issue, thereby requiring the application of the collateral ·estoppel 
branch of res judicata, but with the twist that the factual determination 
was binding on the agency rather than upon a trial court. The trial 
court's function here was one more of review rather than of a de novo 
litigation of a distinct cause of action. Despite the ultimate holding in 
McClanahan, there is nothing to intimate that South Bend Federation 
of Teachers is defunct precedent, at least in the agency-agency context. 
The second important case addressed by McClanahan is Cox v. 
Indiana Subcontractors Association, Inc. 82 The factual issues in the Cox 
case are very similar to those presented in McClanahan: Cox filed a 
claim for unemployment compensation before the Employment Security 
Division after he was terminated from his positions as director and 
board secretary for the Indiana Subcontractors Association.83 The Di-
78. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text. 
79. 514 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
80. 180 Ind. App. at 318, 389 N.E.2d at 34. 
81. Id. at 301, 389 N.E.2d at 25. 
82. 441 N .E.2d 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). 
83. Id. at 224. 
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vision denied him benefits upon its determination that he had been 
terminated for just cause. 84 Cox then filed a suit against the Association 
for, among other things, breach of contract. In turn, the Association 
erected the Division's finding as res judicata on the issue. Like the 
McClanahan court, the Cox court examined the newly rendered opinion 
of Gear v. City of Des Moinesss and, like the McClanahan court, held 
that res judicata was not applicable. The court of appeals held the 
doctrine inappropriate in this instance because "'[it] is simply inapplicable 
to resolve a case as complex as the present one.''86 Cox and McClanahan 
are therefore congruent in result where they both reflect a disinclination 
to give deference to agency decisions in matters of judicial cognizance,. 
However, the Cox result is disturbing because of its lack of rationale. 
The most troubling aspect of the Cox decision is the utter lack of 
analysis of the Gear decision as it should have been applied to the 
matter at hand. There is no disputing that Cox probably set forth the. 
appropriate standards of review as delineated in Gear in a more com-
prehensive fashion than did McClanahan. Unfortunately, such coverage 
does not explain the total lack of application of the Gear elements to 
the Cox facts. Rather, the court made the sweeping generalization that 
q[t]he Review Board [of the Employment Security Division] is not the 
proper authority to determine complex legal issues involving contract 
interpretation and tort issues. " 87 Even if that proposition were true, 88 
this declaration totally ignores the well-developed meaning of the· col-
lateral estoppel prong of res judicata: ''when a particular issue is ad-
judicated and then is put into issue in a subsequent suit on a different 
cause of action between the same· parties or those in privity with them. ''89 
Instead, the Cox court determined that a legal opinion rendered by the 
Division could not prevent relitig_ation of the same question in court. 
The problem is that collateral estoppel is a fact-based principle rather 
than a law-based. The Division had made no contractual determination, 
only a determination of the reasons for Cox's termination, which fact 
would have been an essential element in the Association's defense of 
the breach of contract claim. In other words, the reliability of the Cox 
84. ld. 
85. 514 F~ Supp. 1218 (S.D. Iowa 1981). 
86. Cox, 441 N.E.2d at 226. 
87. /d. at 226. 
88. See, e.g., Metropolitan Dev. Comm 'n v. I. Ching, Inc., 460 N .E.2d 1236, 
1237 (Ind. Ct. App. t984) ("It is ... well settled that landowners seeking to raise the 
issue of [confiscation of property without just compensation] must exhaust their admin-
istrative remedies by presenting the constitutional issue to the Board of Zoning Appeals 
before invoking the aid of the courts."). 
89~ South Bend Fed'n of Teachers v. National Educ. Ass'n, 180 Ind. App. 299, 
314, 389 N.E.2d 23, 32 (1979). 
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decision, as applied to the facts before it, is of questionable value 
although there is without doubt important ramifications for its use as 
a source of the law to apply when other significant cases arise dealing 
with the application of res judicata in the administrative-judicial context. 
There also exists one other Indiana decision of a contemporary 
nature which is noteworthy, if for no other reason than that it sheds 
some additional light on our courts' willingness to apply the doctrine 
of res judicata with regard to agency decisions when the opportunity 
presents itself. In Shortridge v. Review Board of Indiana Employment 
Security Division,90 collateral estoppel was utilized to require the Em-
ployment Security Division to abide by its own findings of fact rendered 
in 1977 when determining benefits to be awarded to the same claimant 
in 1984 proceedings.91 The agency-agency application of res judicata was 
born of an analysis of South Bend Federation of Teachers. 92 However, 
what is interesting about this opinion is its divergence from the Cox 
case in its definitive reliance upon the collateral estoppel doctrine as 
applicable to findings of fact, and not just to the determination of 
singular legal questions as applied to those facts. 
If one can say with any authority that there is a "pattern" to the 
manner in which Indiana courts will consider the doctrine of res judicata 
in giving estoppel effect to agency decisions, the likelihood of success 
is greater when the issue arises in the agency-agency relationship, as in 
South Bend Federation of Teachers and Shortridge. The ·philosophy 
inhering in those two cases is, succinctly, "if there is a reason to settle 
the issues involved once and for all,' '93 courts will not be loathe to 
apply estoppel-type principles to "guard parties against vexatious and 
repetitious litigation of issues which have been determined in a judicial 
or quasi-judicial proceeding.' '94 Both opinions evince little or no patience 
for an agency's decision to reverse itself in subsequent proceedings where 
the legal questions and/or facts at issue remain essentially the same and 
where intervening events have not changed the circumstances upon which 
the initial findings were based. 95 Such philosophy, however, has not been 
translated into the agency-judiciary situation, where the courts seem more 
90. 498 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See also supra notes 68-70 and accom-
panying text. 
91. /d. at 91. 
92. 180 Ind. App. 299, 389 N.E.2d 23 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 
78-81. 
93. South Bend Fed'n of Teachers, 180 Ind. App. at 317, 389 N .E.2d at 34. 
94. 180 Ind. App. at 318, 389 N.E.2d at 35; see also Shortridge, 498 N.E.2d at 
90. 
95. South Bend Fed,n of Teachers, 180 Ind. App. at 317, 389 N.E.2d at 34; 
Shortridge, 498 N .E.2d at 90. 
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reluctant to afford agency decisions the respect sufficient to estop later 
judicial determinations. 
This attitude is best exemplified in Cox. 96 The deference ordinarily 
given by courts to administrative decisions and agency expertise97 fell 
by the wayside when the court of appeals declared, "[t]he Review Board 
lacks the requisite training and experience to determine these matters."98 
That statement calls into question the manner in which an agency makes 
its factual determinations, especially because there seems to be no dispute-
but that collateral estoppel/issue preclusion, rather than estoppel by 
judgment, will be the manner of applying an administrative decision to 
a judicial cause of action. And the supreme court dealt handily with 
this very attitude toward such fact-finding expertise in McClanahan: 
[N]either Remington nor Barbour had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate- the issue of whether McClanahan was discharged for 
refusing to commit an illegal act .... [T]he nature of the ad-
ministrative hearing itself differed substantially from a traditional 
courtroom proceeding. The referee acted as the primary ques-
tioner, and neither party was represented by counsel. Cross-
examination was minimal and ineffective. Inasmuch as the rules 
of evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings, 
a substantial amount of hearsay potentially inadmissible at trial 
was introduced without objection. 
• • * 
In light of all these circumstances, fairness requires that we 
not apply collateral estoppel. The relative informality of the 
particular administrative procedure at issue here does not meet 
the test used in Cox. It is a procedure designed for quick and 
inexpensive determinations. of unemployment benefits. 99 
In essence, the supreme court implies that when an agency decision is 
brought for estoppel consideration before a court, its proceedings must 
be as nearly as akin to a judicial atmosphere as possible or its decisions 
will not merit application in a court of law. By the supreme court's 
very declaration that an agency's decision is specifically designed for 
qquick and inexpensive determinations''' and by reason of the typically 
relaxed evidentiary and procedural requirements allowed in administrative 
96. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89. · 
97. See, e.g., Capital Improvem-ent Bd. of Managers v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 176 
Ind. App. 240, 259, 375 N .E.2d 616, 630 (1978) (''[A court] in reviewing the decision 
of an administrative body is not to substitute its own opinions and conclusions for those 
of the agency, but rather must give deference to the expertise of that agency."). 
98. 441 N .E.2d at 226. 
99. 517 N.E.2d at 394-95. 
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proceedings, 100 it is unlikely that administrative decisions will ever become 
an integral part of the collateral estoppel doctrine in Indiana within the 
judicial arena, despite the representations to the contrary in McClanahan 
v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc. 
100. IND. CoDE § 4-21.5-3-25(b) (1988) provides: 
"The administrative law judge shall regulate the course of the proceedings ... 
in an informal manner without recourse to the technical, common rules of 
evidence applicable to civil actions in the courts." 
IND. ConE § 4-21.5-3-34 (1988) provides: 
''An agency is encouraged to develop informal procedures that are consistent 
with this article and make unnecessary more elaborate proceedings under this 
article. 
